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There is a growing interest in narrative for policy making in 
community development. The implicit assumption in most projects is 
that just making stories available will increase recognition in readers 
and by some automatic process it will enhance understanding and 
thereby a sense of community. In this essay I want to explore this 
assumption, as it makes the value of narrative self-evident, but may 
leave its full potential for community development untouched. To find 
answers, I look for a starting point in what we all share: our biology. 
From there, I propose that narrative is the language we use to 




It’s true you can’t live here by chance, 
You have to do and be, not simply watch 
Or even describe. This is the city of action, 
The world headquarters of the verb – 
(Edmond, 2002, p. 142) 
 
 
 In the Netherlands, there is a growing interest in narrative, not 
only in various academic disciplines, but also for some ten years in 
policy-making for community development. In some projects, stories 
from formal or informal communities are collected and made 
available. For instance, the project Verhalen uit de stad (Stories from 
the City) in Amsterdam is based on the assumption that recognizable 
stories will bring the residents of the city closer together (City of 
Amsterdam). In other projects, learning to tell, share, and listen to 
stories is a vehicle to increase social cohesion. An example is the 
Dutch method Buurtreminiscentie (Neighborhood Reminiscence), 
whereby  
 
the sharing of memories makes it possible to work up the 
community into an experienced unity. Connecting people 
through the stories they share with each other leads to the 
development and reinforcement of unity. By involving more and 
49           BASTEN: GOING NARRATIVE 
 
 
more groups and individuals an increasingly large part of the 
neighborhood will be interconnected by the stories they share. 
(Verduin, 2009, p. 20, translation mine) 
 
The implicit assumption in both projects—and there are similar 
examples—is that just making stories available will increase 
recognition in the public and by some automatic process it will 
enhance understanding and thereby a community feeling. In the 
second project, the emphasis is also on the so-called activation of 
citizens. In this article I want to explore this assumption, as it makes 
the value of narrative self-evident (who could be against community 
feeling and social cohesion in today’s “Big Society” discourse, echoed 
by Dutch government?), but may leave its full potential for 
community development untapped. For instance, the examples show 
the importance of the aesthetic, amusing, and/or therapeutic 
characteristics of stories, but do not go deeply into what it is that 
actually establishes the connection between individuals. This is the 
narrative value I examine here.  
As a rough guide to this text, let me underscore beforehand 
that I have written it as the academic I am today. In their discussion of 
the consecutive crises in qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln  
(2005) pinpoint the origins of the crisis of representation in a bundle 
of works that “made research and writing more reflexive and called 
into question the issues of gender, class, and race” (p. 18). Moreover, 
behind the qualitative research process “stands the personal biography 
of the researcher, who speaks from a particular class, gender, racial, 
cultural, and ethnic community perspective. … Any gaze is always 
filtered through the lenses of language, gender, social class, race, and 
ethnicity” (p. 21). To this personal biography I want to add the 
disciplinary upbringing of the researcher. The practice (Bourdieu, 
1980) in which academics are disciplined is of relevance to how their 
thinking and reasoning are shaped. My own upbringing was first in the 
humanities and second in the social sciences. It was not until after my 
graduation, when I started to work at the faculty of Natural Sciences, 
that I realized that an important element of what it means to be human 
had been missing in my schooling. I guess I had been trained in the 
tradition of what Slingerland (2008) calls the “High Humanist stance,” 
 
which holds that the humanities are a sui generis and 
autonomous field of inquiry, approachable only by means of 
special sensibility produced by humanistic training itself [... 
and the ...] conviction that only trained humanists can seriously 
engage in humanistic inquiry. (pp. 2-3) 
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As a consequence,  
 
By enthusiastically embracing the confines of an ontologically 
divided world [i.e. nature/explain versus mind/understand]—
and vigorously opposing and often demonizing anyone who 
dares to question this divide—it seems to me that humanists 
have doomed themselves to endlessly and onanistically spinning 
stories inside of stories. (p. 4)  
 
In the intellectual autobiography with which Slingerland prefaces his 
book, he writes about the reactions of his colleagues and friends from 
graduate school when they hear about his interest in behavioral 
neuroscience: “As they slip away, I sometimes note wistful 
expressions of regret: they know that I had a perfectly respectable 
humanistic upbringing. What went wrong?” (2008, p. xi). In my own 
student years I had not noticed any hostility towards the natural 
sciences. They were simply non-existent. With my first job I entered a 
new world. As I continued my scholarly development into the 
narrative analyst I am today, every now and then I visited the natural 
sciences to see if I could find answers for one of my most nagging 
questions: is it valid to assume the existence of narrative patterns 
outside of my own interpretations?  
 Atkinson and Delamont (2005) acknowledge that there is 
patterning in the social world, but how do we leap from the individual 
to the social and what—if anything—does narrativity have to do with 
it? If we can explain how narrative patterns come about and how they 
relate to social change, then the arguments for narrative policy- 
making become all the stronger. Surely, to humanities scholars, the 
arguments for narrative policy-making may be clear, as they are used 
to appreciating the contingencies of local contexts and to assiduously 
attempting to do justice and give voice to the particular. However, to 
policy-makers, for it to grow out of the experimental sphere and 
become a habit, more convincing arguments may have to be put 
forward as their approach to justice is focused on the general. This 
essay is designed to share my findings. It is structured along the lines 
of if-then reasoning: if assumption X is plausible, can we then assume 
Y as its consequence? This shapes my essay as a metalogue, “a 
conversation about some problematic subject. This conversation 
should be such that not only do the participants discuss the problem, 
but the structure of the conversation as a whole is also relevant to the 
same subject” (Bateson, 1972, p. 1). Unlike the metalogues between 
Bateson and his daughter, my metalogue will be the reflection of a 
thinking-out-loud exercise by myself, giving it here and there a 
confessional tone (Van Maanen, 1988). 
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I start with an outline of the starting point for my expedition 
that is suggested in “but where will it take us?” and then continue my 
search to finish with policy-making for community development.  
 
From Population to Individual to Species 
 
 In some disciplines it is a common assumption that biographies 
are highly individual and that, as a consequence, so are the narrated 
biographies. This assumption is related to what Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005) outline as a crisis of representation that reoccurred in sociology 
in the mid-1980s. Academics from critical theory, feminist theory, and 
post-colonial theory maintained that the neutrality of representation of 
the “other” was a fiction. They preferred theories that focus on 
patterns over theories that depart from causal loops and linear 
relations. This crisis continued in the following decade, when 
poststructuralists and postmodernists criticized representation, 
legitimacy, and the praxis of the social sciences. They first questioned 
the possibility of representing lived experiences without mediation 
and claimed instead that these experiences were products of 
researchers’ texts. The second put aside the aspirations of the grand 
narratives that try to offer all-embracing explanations for humanity, 
often mutually exclusive and oppressive. They turned to local, small-
scale theories instead (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). In response to the 
decline of grand narratives that described whole populations with 
fixed categories, scholars started to focus on micro- sociologies based 
on qualitative methods.  
The before-mentioned assumption of uniqueness is, however, 
contested by the upsurge every now and then of vibrant collective 
narratives. The processes of scapegoating (Girard, 1982) and moral 
panics (Victor, 1998), wherein individuals of/or minority groups are 
broadly appointed as wrongdoers and thereby accused of bringing 
about great social distress—and sometimes violently expelled with 
general consent—as well as the “emergence of fashion trends, the ebb 
and flow of crime waves, … the transformation of unknown books 
into bestsellers, or the rise of teenage smoking” and other phenomena 
Gladwell calls social epidemics (2001, p. 7), are all instances of 
jointly told narratives and their translation into action. Unlike the 
grand narratives that were of a hegemonic character and more or less 
covertly imposed, scapegoating, moral panics, and social epidemics 
are grounded in popular convictions and spread in a more outspoken 
and horizontal way. The discursive practices that Foucault (1975) 
describes as historically grounded in truth regimes share similar 
features as the power to define circulates in multi-dimensional 
networks, but in general these practices are of a more stable nature. 
                                                             NARRATIVE WORKS 2(1)           52  
The ideologies Van Dijk (1998) analyzes are of a similar joint and 
stable character. Collective narratives, be they implicit or explicit, 
evolving or disruptive, show us that narratives are also of a nature that 
surpasses the individual, of a fabric that is inter-individual. In other 
words, narrative research presupposes inter-relatedness or patterning. 
Of course, the ambition to study narrative in the first place indicates 
this awareness; otherwise, all individual narratives would be 
incomprehensible to begin with. Most narrative researchers indeed 
depart from a text in context. Still, the origins of the relationship or 
interconnectedness between the two and, moreover, the role of 
narrative therein, remain unclear. The relations are assumed to exist—
albeit not in an essentialist, universal form but varying across 
cultures—rather than their non-cultural origins being explored in the 
humanities and social sciences (Slingerland, 2008). 
In my own evolution as an analyst, looking back I can see how 
I started from a structuralist framework and moved on to a 
poststructuralist and even postmodern framework. This worked out 
quite well for me on a theoretical level. However, on a practical and 
empirical level, it failed to explain collective narratives and, indeed, 
collective actions. The risk of solipsism lurks if interconnectedness is 
disregarded. Maybe I had taken the leap to poststructuralism and 
postmodernism too easily. Is there indeed no such thing as an 
Archimedean point that serves as a certain point of reference to us all? 
How are we then able to share anything? Solving this puzzle was of 
great urgency to me, as I make my living with narrative sociology. At 
least I should have valid assumptions about shared narrative patterns 
in groups. And then I hit myself on the head, as I sometimes do when 
I find an answer that has been staring me in the face all along: “It’s the 
biology, stupid!” I yelled to myself, paraphrasing Bill Clinton. What 
unites all narratives, from ante-narrative (Boje, 2001) and micro- or 
small stories (Boje, 2001, Georgakopoulou, 2006) to grand narratives 
(Lyotard, 1979) and everything in between, is that they are generated 
by humans. They are human products. This epiphany brought me back 
to my thought experiments about language and communication 
halfway through the 1990s as I tried to figure out what, if any, were 
the connections between language and reality, between thought and 
action in the first place.  
In this essay I explore whether I can make my reasoning back 
then productive for my thinking about narrative now. A lot of research 
is about what narrative is or does, but little research explores where it 
comes from. This I find a promising starting point for the expedition 
into “but where will it take us.” If we consider narrative as inherently 
human, can we then assume biological origins? If so, is it then safe to 
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assume it is characteristic of our species? These questions will be 
explored in the next section. 
 
On the Origins of Narrative 
 
 Biologists Maturana and Varela (1984) distinguish between 
organization and structure. An organization is a collection of all 
relations that necessarily exist between the components of a system 
for it to be a member of a specific class. A structure is the collection 
of the components and relations that actually form a unity and that 
grant the organization its reality. Structure is the incorporation of 
organization. Organization determines the identity of a system; 
structure determines how its parts are physically articulated. The 
difference is similar to the one perhaps more familiar to us, namely 
between langue and parole. Biographies may be unique, but their 
narrated manifestations share common features (that allow, for 
instance, the literary transformations Sools, 2012, demonstrates 
elsewhere in this issue). Abbott (2008), for instance, speaks of the 
“Horatio Alger story” in terms of a master plot. Nineteenth-century 
novelist Alger published over 120 books, most of which “narrativize 
the same master plot featuring a youth… , who, though born in 
poverty, rises by his own hard work and clean living to the highest of 
social standards and often great wealth” (Abbott, 2008, p. 47). 
Although the characters in the Alger novels are fictive, we recognize 
their story in real-life characters like Andrew Carnegie and Abe 
Lincoln, “and it expresses in its shape convictions about life that are 
dear to many Americans” (p. 47). The presence of master plots 
suggests that they are of a different level than the individual 
biographies themselves. One could say that the “master plot” is 
organization and the “Horatio Alger” story is structure, but there are 
more master plots and this suggests that master plots themselves are 
structure, assuming an organization. If all humans narrate (tell stories, 
however structured), then narrative is on the level of the species and 
part of the organization. This also explains its broad variety on the 
structural level. As a sociologist with a background in the humanities, 
I usually study patterns in narratives. That is, I am occupied with the 
narratives as manifestations, the product of what Schiff (2012; in this 
issue) calls “making present.” I study the parole to see if I can learn 
something about the langue. As said, for me to be able to do so, I have 
to assume that there indeed is a langue, some generative source we all 
tap from. Is there indeed a narrative aspect on the level of the 
organization?  
What sets us living beings apart from non-living entities is that 
we continuously produce ourselves. Maturana and Varela (1984) call 
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this autopoiesis, self creation. Autopoietic systems are both and at the 
same time producer and product. They are autonomous in that they are 
capable of specifying their own regularities. However, they depend on 
their environment for resources that enable them to maintain their 
system. In other words, there is a paradox: autopoietic—read, 
autonomous—systems depend on their environment for the 
maintenance of their autonomy. This paradox can only be solved if we 
go beyond linear thinking and its consequent binary models. 
Therefore, Maturana and Varela (1984) propose a circular reasoning. 
Every class creates its own phenomenology, and in the case of 
autopoietic systems, this is a biological one of circular productivity. 
They explain: 
 
Since a living system is defined as a system by the 
concatenation of processes of production of components that 
generate the processes that produce them and constitute the 
system as a unity in the physical space, biological phenomena 
are necessarily phenomena of relations between processes which 
satisfy the autopoiesis of the participant living systems. 
Accordingly, under no circumstances is a biological 
phenomenon defined by the properties of its component 
elements, but it is always defined and constituted by a 
concatenation of processes in relations subordinated to the 
autopoiesis of at least one living system. (p. 112-113) 
 
In this sense, two people accidentally running into each other is not a 
biological phenomenon, whereas the bodily contact of two people 
courting is. Certainly, in the first case there are processes, but they do 
not satisfy the autopoiesis of anyone. Contrarily, in the latter case, 
they do. Maturana and Varela (1984) explain the difference by 
grounding circular productivity in two aphorisms: 1) all doing is 
knowing and all knowing is doing, and 2) everything that is being 
said, is said by someone. To know, as an act of the knower, is deeply 
rooted in his or her being alive, in the organization. As a consequence, 
all knowledge creation depends on the structure of the knower. To 
know is a generative act, an act that enables living beings to continue 
living in a specific environment by creating their own world. There is 
a circular relationship between acting and experiencing. We do not see 
a “space” in the outer world, but we experience our own imaginative 
space as “real.” The world we know is the world we perceive. It is our 
structure that enables our perception. As our structure is our individual 
materialization of the organization that we are part of, perceptions are 
highly individual. However, living systems are part of a larger 
network of exchanges as they depend on their environments for 
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resources to maintain autopoiesis. Ontogenesis is the history of 
structural changes that a system undergoes without loss of 
organization.  
If the interactions of two or more autopoietic systems have a 
recurrent or very stable character, there is an ontogenetic coupling 
between them. Every ontogenesis takes place within an environment. 
Both autopoietic systems and environments can be described in terms 
of their structure (radiation, velocity, density, etc.). Autopoietic 
systems and their environments, including other autopoietic systems, 
are pacemakers for structural change as they influence and are being 
influenced by each other. However, they elicit or trigger changes, but 
do not determine or instruct them. The response depends on the proper 
structure at that moment, not on the external stimulus. Yet recursive 
interactions result in a history of mutually attuned structural changes. 
This is called structural coupling, and it results in congruence 
between the systems. On an intimate scale, we see this congruenc, for 
instance, in what one might call “family sayings” (e.g. Rees, 1995), a 
private lexicon within close families which is rather incomprehensible 
to outsiders. Sometimes this lexicon is created by a lack of regular 
words. In my family, I introduced the word invouwing (“infoldment”) 
because I did not know the word oksel (“armpit”) yet. And sometimes 
the utterance is a catch-phrase, such as “straight into the muscle,” an 
innocent description my sister used to tell my parents where I had hit 
her, now still used in my family to indicate “bull’s eye!” Moreover, 
expressions do not have to be verbal, as gestures and facial 
expressions can be quite communicative as well. I sometimes put on a 
face that my family calls “snuik,” a word I cannot translate in any 
language nor an expression I can describe. This kind of intimate 
communication reflects a structural coupling and congruence between 
autopoietic systems, in this case my family members and me. As 
autopoietic systems depend on their environment for the sake of their 
autonomy, these structural couplings are of vital importance. As 
Maturana and Varela (1984) put it, all knowing subjects are involved 
in all knowledge processes in a personal way, rooted in their 
biological structure. Their impression of sure and secure facts are 
individual phenomena. They do not regard the knowledge activities of 
others. This circular productivity of knowledge leads to a loneliness 
that can only be survived in a world that is jointly created with others.  
Where, then, do we go from closed circuits to 
interconnectedness? This has to be the transitional space of the 
relations between processes. This space is the domain of 
communication and language as products of the structural couplings 
of autopoietic systems (Maturana & Varela, 1984). One could suggest 
that narrative is the language with which we communicate our 
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structural couplings. However, that would propose a one-on-one, 
magical relationship between language and reality (e.g. Vinden, 
1998). It would also deny the space within the sign between signified 
and signifier. Therefore, I suggest that narrative is the language with 
which we communicate about the structural couplings as we perceive 
them.  
This is somewhat different from the traditional notion of 
narrative as the structure in which events are linked in a particular 
way. From a biological perspective, we have to define “event” first as 
a biological phenomenon. As stated earlier, two people bumping into 
each other is not a biological phenomenon, whereas two people 
courting is. Why so? Because in the first case there is no structural 
coupling and in the second case there is. Bumping into one another 
only becomes an event if it ends in courting (or some other type of 
relationship between two autopoietic systems). This is in line with the 
distinction that Culler (1981) makes between narrative as 
representation and narrative as construction. Narrative as 
representation departs from the event (first there was the event, then 
the representation of it), whereas narrative as construction ends in the 
event (first there was the narrative, then there was the creation of the 
event in the context of that narrative). An event is then a structural 
change within the autopoietic system, dependent on the structure of 
that same autopoietic system at that moment in time, that is, when it is 
informative for the system. In other words, an event is an event when 
the autopoietic system attaches meaning to it. If we assume that 
knowing is doing, is there then a special place for the verb in 
narrative? 
 
The Land of the Verb 
 
 Of course, not all communication is verbal. My “snuik” face is 
as non-verbal as it gets. Still, here I am interested in the linguistic and 
ultimately share-ability of narrative. How do we express what we 
perceive in such a way that we can share our perceptions, make the 
individual inter-dividual? As Glenberg (2008) proposes, the meaning 
of a situation or event consists of the set of actions one can undertake 
in that situation. The set of possible actions is determined by the goal-
directed mesh of affordances. An affordance is the interaction 
between body morphology and the physical environment. In other 
words, it is our perception of what an object affords us to do with it, 
how it enables us to interact with it in what way. A mesh is the process 
by which affordances are combined to accomplish goals. The 
Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg, 2008) proposes that we use three 
processes to convert words and sentences into embodied, action-based 
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meaning. We go from words to a consideration of the actions implied 
by the sentence and if we create a smooth and coherent simulation, 
then we understand the sentence. These three processes are: 1) 
indexing or mapping words and phrases to objects in the environment 
or to perceptual symbols; 2) derivation of affordances; and 3) 
meshing. 
 To understand the first process, the “orientational metaphors” 
of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) can be helpful. These are metaphors 
that organize whole systems of concepts with respect to one another. 
“Orientational” refers to their spatial orientation. As they explain,  
 
These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies 
of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our 
physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a 
spatial orientation … . Such metaphorical orientations are not 
arbitrary. They have a basis in our physical and cultural 
experience. Though the polar positions up-down, in-out, etc., are 
physical in nature, the orientational metaphors based on them 
can vary from culture to culture. (p. 14) 
 
They conclude that “Most of our fundamental concepts are organized 
in terms of one or more spatialization metaphors” (p. 17). As they 
elaborate, health and life are “up” (Lazarus rose from the dead) and 
illness and death are down (she fell ill, he dropped dead). 
Correspondingly the concept of happiness is structured in terms of the 
erect posture (that lifts the spirit) and that of sadness with a drooping 
posture (I’m down), physical size with strength (I have control over 
her) or weakness (he is under my control). In general, everything 
positive is spatially termed as “up,” whereas everything negative is 
termed as “down,” even when there is no clear reference to physical 
terms (high/low income, the top/bottom of the social ladder). All 
orientational metaphors are rooted in experience. This is not to 
suggest that all “up” metaphors are the same. The concept is the same, 
but the experiences on which they are based are very different. There 
is not necessarily a variety in “ups,” yet verticality enters our 
experience in many different ways. Still, there is coherence among 
happiness, health, and control as “up” metaphors. Within such a 
coherent system, saying “I’m down” while meaning “I’m happy” is an 
aberration.  
A further basis for understanding is our experience with objects 
and substances. This is part of the second process, the derivation of 
affordances. As Glenberg (2008) states: “Note that the affordances 
cannot be derived directly from the words because words do not have 
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affordances. Instead, it is the objects that words designate that have 
the affordances and are a major source of meaning” (p. 46). 
 This is similar to the Saussurian divide between signifier and 
signified within the sign. The relationship between the two is 
sometimes iconic, that is, related to reality. Examples are 
paralinguistic aspects such as intonation, speed, and volume in speech 
acts or onomatopoeic words as ding dong. However, most 
relationships are arbitrary. And yet we are able to enter the linguistic 
space we create on the organizational/langue level and learn to share 
meaning on the structural/parole level. How do we do that? Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) introduce the term “ontological metaphors” to 
describe how “our experiences with physical objects (especially our 
own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide range of 
ontological metaphors, that is, ways of viewing events, activities, 
emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances” (p. 25). Doing so 
 
allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as 
discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Once we can 
identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to 
them, categorize them, and quantify them—and, by this means, 
reason about them. (p. 25) 
 
Also, we assess what we can do with these entities and 
substances: “Apparently, when we think about the meaning of a word, 
at least some part of that meaning is in terms of how to act on the 
object named by the word” (Glenberg, 2008, p. 51). How we 
conceptualize experiences in terms of ontological metaphors and how 
we consequently apply them is part of the meshing process, when we 
combine affordances into actions. This implies some knowledge of 
what we can do and again, this is grounded in our experience. For 
instance, as we are bounded by our skins and experience the world as 
“outside,” we experience ourselves as containers with a surface and an 
in-out orientation. We project these qualities onto other physical 
objects with similar characteristics but also onto our natural 
environments (in/out of the woods), or we impose them on less clearly 
bounded areas when we mark off territory (fencing it, naming it). As 
we look at something, our field of vision defines a boundary in that 
there is something we can see and other things we cannot (I have him 
in sight). Likewise, we turn events, actions, activities and states into 
discrete entities. These examples are instances of what Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) call “container metaphors.” They enable us to identify 
meanings in situations and events as they inform us about the actions 
we can undertake therein. Meshing, then, is to combine the 
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affordances into a coherent simulation. Meshing is contingent. We 
evaluate actions based on our estimation of their do-ability.  
That this is all part of our biology is supported by research into 
depression narratives. For instance, Westerbeek and Mutsaers (2008) 
found that “Several authors underline that depression as an experience 
can hardly be expressed verbally; it is played out in a parallel infernal 
universe in which time stands still and where language is inadequate” 
(p. 31). For example, 
 
Some nebulous force has moved you into this chambered and 
unearthly landscape, its origins obscure, its meridians 
unmapped. It is a state unto itself. . . . You are resident now in 
some parallel universe, a place inclined to resist the concrete 
nouns, verbs, and adjectives we use to describe other 
landscapes. (Jeffrey Smith in Westerbeek & Mutsaers, 2008, p. 
38) 
 
Since I’ve been on Prozac I came to think that I need to 
reconstruct an entire record of my life, including all small bits 
and pieces of the tape that I threw away into a waste basket, in 
order to see it all again and put it together in a totally new way. 
The logic in my script is lost and chronology does not agree 
anymore either: everything clatters as a pocket full of coins—
I’ll have to rewrite the whole story. (Emma Brunt in 
Westerbeek & Mutsaers, 2008, p. 41) 
 
These narratives reveal that in a state of depression, sufferers can no 
longer perceive meaningful—that is, in time and place demarcated—
events and so cannot find the words to talk about them. Indeed, the 
inability to perceive and structure, to create containers and orientate, 
in short, to have a sense of knowing what is going on, leads to an 
inability to actually keep going on. 
But even if we take our bodies as the points of departure for 
conceptualizing ourselves and our world, we still need to explain the 
notion of shared concepts as the ingredients for communication. How 
do we know that “I’m down” is not generally used for “I’m happy”? 
Obviously, we may experience the same things, as our bodies are to a 
large degree built the same way. Moreover, as Semin and Cacioppo 
(2008) argue, “our representations of the social world are 
fundamentally connected with the actions that our bodies perform” (p. 
120). Still, how do we recognize our experiences in others’ 
experiences? In other words, how does this attuning in structural 
coupling take place? This is the biological foundation of the social 
which I will explore in the next section. 
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The Importance of Being “Us” 
 
 As Maturana and Varela (1984) suggest, structural couplings 
create a communicative space. In order to understand this space, we 
should abandon the individual and move towards the dyad as our unit 
of analysis. The dyad is created by affect attunement and 
synchronization. Stern (1985) defines affect attunement as “the 
performance of behaviors that express the quality of feeling of a 
shared affect state without imitating the exact behavioral expression of 
the inner state” (p. 142). In their Social Cognition (SC) model, Semin 
and Cacioppo (2008) hypothesize that synchronization brings about 
the distribution of social cognition across brains. The starting point is 
the observation of the action of another person. We perceive this 
action more clearly as its goal relates more to us. If the goal relates to 
us, the observation serves as a stimulus. Next, and aside from 
activating a goal, all actions, regardless of their relevance, activate an 
implicit monitoring process that they call “Monitoring 
Synchronization”: 
 
The multimodal neurophysiological sensorimotor processes 
involved in the execution of any real (or imagined) action give 
rise to synchronization of neurophysiological sensorimotor 
processes in the observer of human action … . Aside from their 
monitoring function, these processes link two or more human 
agents, thereby putting them on a similar footing. It is jointly 
recruited processes with overlapping “identities” that facilitate 
understanding (co-cogitation) and adaptive co-action (co-
regulation) between two or more individuals. (p. 123; emphasis 
added) 
 
In the quotation above, I stress the word “overlapping,” as Semin and 
Cacioppo (2008) explain that synchronization is not about complete 
equivalence between producer and receiver of stimuli. This would 
create confusion between self and other, which is in general not the 
case. Moreover, it would lead to a never-ending loop of continuously 
performing the very same actions. In contrast, synchronization is a 
partial correspondence.  
Affect attunement and synchronization as described by, 
respectively, Stern (1985) and Semin & Cacioppo (2008), address 
non-verbal exchanges, but my family sayings suggest they can be 
verbal as well. Moreover, these sayings can be considered both as 
expressions of belonging (being the dyad) and vehicles for 
understanding (creating the dyad). Cognition, says Glenberg (2008), is 
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for action. Language comprehension involves the simulation of action. 
Acting in a linguistic space calls upon neural systems that are also 
used for perception, action, and emotional processing. This is called 
neural exploitation (Glenberg, 2008). When we hear verbs, there is 
action in Wernicke’s area (language perception), in Broca’s area 
(language production), and in the areas of the brain associated with 
motor activity. In other words, when we engage in communication, 
our brains function as if we, as recipients of stimuli, undergo the same 
structural change as their source.  
 
Back to My Nagging Question 
 
 So, is it valid to assume the existence of narrative patterns 
outside of my own interpretations? I think my answer is a “yes” when 
we involve biology in our reasoning. Admittedly, I am not a biologist 
and the field is far richer and more complex than I can or dare present 
here. And of course, there is a risk involved in translating one 
discipline into another. Sociobiology is a case in point that also shows 
ethical limitations to unthinkingly superimposing one conceptual 
framework on another. And yet, understanding narrative can be 
enriched by understanding biology. Biology stresses the importance of 
our bodies and the relationships between our bodies and the 
environments we occupy with them, our moving around between 
objects and people, concepts and events, our interactions with them, 
how we perceive and experience and share. As narrative has survived 
for such a long time, it has to have some evolutionary benefits for it to 
have become part of the organization of the human species. The 
ability to enter the interconnecting domain of language and 
communication serves an evolutionary purpose—that is, the survival 
of the species. Understanding narrative from an evolutionary 
perspective helps us to reason about text, context, the interrelations 
between them, and the role of narrative therein. As I proposed earlier, 
narrative is the language we use to communicate about structural 
couplings as we perceive them. We can enrich this definition with the 
concept of “overlap” and hypothesize that narrative is our ability to 
create overlaps by communicating about structural couplings as we 
perceive them. As such, it is both text and context. As a biological 
phenomenon of living systems, it obeys the logic of circular 
productivity, “the concatenation of processes of production of 
components that generate the processes that produce them and 
constitute the system as a unity in the physical space” (Maturana & 
Varela, 1980, p. 112). Narrative is, then, the linking pin between 
inside and outside, between text and context, between organization 
and structure. It produces the overlap and therein serves as a tracking 
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device. As such, it is a boundary concept that helps us understand 
where we are.  
The importance of being “us” is familiar in my own academic 
habitat. For instance, in his book The Songlines, Chatwin (1987) 
describes the patterns that unify Australian Aboriginals to their 
ancestors and their land as 
 
the labyrinth of invisible pathways which meander all over 
Australia and are known to Europeans as “Dreaming-tracks” or 
“Songlines”; to the Aboriginals as the “Footprints of the 
Ancestors” or the “Way of the Law.” Aboriginal Creation myths 
tell of the legendary totemic beings who had wandered over the 
continent in the Dreamtime, singing out the name of everything 
that crossed their path—birds, animals, plants, rocks, 
waterholes—and so singing the world into existence. (p. 2) 
 
This is a clear and appealing example of how autopoietic systems 
create a joint space in which they participate. Obviously, the spatial 
environment is part of this co-created social environment and, in fact, 
an active co-constructor as its elements are part of the structural 
couplings between system and environment (see also Willemse, 2012, 
in this issue on a narrative that is “all over the place”). As mentioned 
earlier, if narrative is part of the organization of our species, then it 
must provide us with benefits to have survived our evolution for such 
a long time. And maybe it has become even more timely in some 
societies, where we can create structural couplings with just about 
anyone and anything. Indeed, now that we have moved into an era in 
which communication is less and less real-time and face-to-face and 
all the more an act of disentangled producers and consumers, maybe 
the evolutionary benefits of narrative for the survival of the social, of 
“us,” are becoming acutely tangible. This brings me to a concluding 
remark about the relationship between narrative and policy-making. 
 
But Where Will It Take Us? 
 
 As a biological phenomenon, narrative is informative but not 
determinant. This type of “advisory relationship” is also known in the 
social sciences. For instance, working with Mills’ vocabularies of 
motives, Foucault’s discourse analysis and Wittgenstein’s language 
games, Holstein and Gubrium (2000) develop a theoretical framework 
for narrative analysis that focuses on how people construct their selves 
in interactions. The contexts in which these interactions take place set 
the conditions for possible linguistic choices and actions, but do not 
determine them. Where does this leave policy-making and its desire to 
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actually determine interactions and relations between people, citizens 
and states, consumers and providers of public services? 
Today, policy-making has an inclination towards large-scale, 
unambiguous facts. Part of this is inspired by the desire to do justice to 
all or to serve a large market. It tries to define the organization of the 
social by determining the future. However, as such, it often disregards 
structural variety in the here and now. Elsewhere (Basten, 2010), I 
have argued that the matter of “who is to be studied” and “made 
object of policy” is decided beforehand and therefore also informs the 
focus and outcome of the analysis. This is most visible in a priori 
categories, where race, social class, and gender seem to produce 
conditions rather than being the products of attribution. It is an 
Ouroboros that bites its own tale: people are involved in research 
based on who they are and subsequently defined in terms of those very 
same selection criteria. This is a circularity that results in self-
fulfilling prophecies. Can narrative, as theorized here, inspire a 
different approach?  
Policy-making is future oriented. By itself, narrative does not 
take us anywhere. We are not driven by our narrative sensibility or 
predisposition. However, it advises us on what directions we might 
take. As Sools (2012) and Squire (2012) argue (in this issue), future 
steps are part of narrative. I suggest this is because they create a 
relationship between “what is” and “what is not yet.” Every relation 
has, in order to be informative, a meaning: 
 
“Meaning” may be regarded as an approximate synonym of 
pattern, redundancy, information, and “restraint,” within a 
paradigm of the following sort: Any aggregate of events or 
subjects ... shall be said to contain “redundancy” or “pattern” if 
the aggregate be divided in any way by a “slash mark,” such that 
an observer perceiving only what is on one side of the slash 
mark, can guess, with better than random success, what is on the 
other side of the slash mark. We may say that what is on one 
side of the slash mark contains information or has meaning 
about what is on the other side. (Bateson, 1972, p. 130-131).  
 
This also goes for relations in time. We may guess, but do not know 
what is on the other side of the slash mark. By creating redundancy, 
the “sure guess” resembles the experience of knowing. And yet, in the 
end, all we can do is guess our way into the future. Regarding policy, 
this may inspire a different route to take than the one travelled so far. 
Instead of starting from guessing what people need and then 
determining who is in want, it can begin by exploring the event-based 
networks people narrate in, locate where people position themselves, 
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and what, if any, their needs are in that position. I have outlined this 
method elsewhere (Basten, 2010) and experimented with it as well. 
For instance, in one of my projects in community development 
(Basten, 2011), I reconstructed a jointly told narrative of an urban 
area, based on 26 interviews. This narrative gave rise to active 
networks of residents, entrepreneurs, professionals, and civil servants 
who shared a concern for one or more of the issues that emerged from 
the narrative. With this essay, I hope to have given the rationale for, 
and thereby inspired trust in, narrative policy-making. If valid, it also 
implies that policy-makers have to be part of the structural couplings 
with the ones they make policies for. As mentioned earlier, meaning is 
related to the perceived action radius. The meaning of policy-making, 
then, depends not so much on the narratives it creates, but all the more 
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